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1. Introdution to hash funtion theory
1. 1. Cryptographi seure one-way hash funtion
1. 1. 1. hash function
Hash function h is a function that takes an input of arbitrary length and produces a
ﬁxed length output (digest). A hash function is a deterministic function which produ-
ces an output from uniform distribution on any set of random inputs. Hash functions
are used in data structures to ensure constant access time (a hash of an element is
used as its address). In cryptography, they are used as message authentication codes
(MAC), and manipulation detection codes (MDC), therefore they are required to have
additional properties.
1. 1. 2. cryptographic properties
 preimage resistance (one-wayness): given a digest D it is hard to ﬁnd any M
such that D = h(M)
a function is one-way iff
 it is easy to compute, which means there is a probabilistic polynomial time
bounded Turing machine which computes h(M) from M
 it is hard to invert, which means given a digest D, there is no probabilistic
polynomial time bounded Turing machine which computes M such that
D = h(M) with satisfactory probability; alternatively every probabilistic
polynomial time bounded Turing machine computes M such that D =
h(M) with a negligible probability.
The existence of one-way function is not proved, and a proof of its existence
would be a solution of well-known P = NP problem [24].
 second preimage resistance: given an input M1, it is hard to ﬁnd another input
M2 such that h(M1) = H(M2).
 collision-resistance: it is hard to ﬁnd two diﬀerent messages M1 and M2 such
that h(M1) = h(M2)
it is hard means there is no better way than a brute force attack, ideally a
hash function is an instance of a random oracle
length(oracle(M)) = n, then
 brute force attack on preimage-resistance: takes 2n queries
 brute force attack on second preimage-resistance: takes 2n queries
 brute force attack on collision-resistance: takes 2
n
2 queries
However, we will show that most widely used hash functions do not behave like
a random oracle and a brute force attack requires less computational power.
In this paper whenever we refer to a hash function we mean a cryptographic secure
one-way hash function.
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1. 2. Constrution of a hash funtion
One-wayness requires the function to be easily computable. Therefore a hash function
is often constructed from a compression function, which takes ﬁxed length input
and produces ﬁxed output; and the compression function is iterated. A compression
function with cryptographic properties can be used to build a secure hash function.
However, the fact that a hash function is based on a secure compression function is
not suﬃcient for a hash function to be secure [1].
1. 2. 1. Construction of a compression function
Compression function can be constructed from a block cipher [2].
 Davies-Meyer
 Miyaguchi-Preneel modiﬁcation of Davies-Meyer construction
These constructions are widely used, however, they are not secure enough, because
they rely on properties, which a block cipher does not quarantee. For further infor-
mation on block cipher based hash/compression function the reader is referred to
[25].
1. 2. 2. Building of a hash function
 Merkle-Damgard [3]
 iteration of random oracle using a chaining value (intermediate vector).
Message is padded with zeros.
 the digest is the last chaining value
 Merkle-Damgard strenghtening [3]
Merkle and Damgard found independently a construction of a hash function
from a random oracle. The oracle takes an input of ﬁxed length and produces
an output of ﬁxed length. The oracle is parametrized by chaining value.
The ﬁrst chaining value is called initialization vector (IV) and is publicly known.
The digest is the last chaining value. The oracle takes a chaining value, and a
message block and produces a new chaining value. This way, the computation
is iterated until the end of message is reached. The message is padded with a
block containing the message length.
 padding block contains a message length to prevent 2nd preimage long-
message attack.
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 the digest is the last chaining value
 Merkle-Damgard with ﬁxed oﬀset [35]
 the last but one chaining value is XORed with publicly known value c
 the digest is the last chaining value
 Enveloped Merkle-Damgard [1]
 Merkle-Damgard for all blocks save the last one, which produces a chaining
value C
 the digest is obtained from a query to a random oracle (a diﬀerent ran-
dom oracle from the one used in Merkle-Damgard iteration). The oracle is
initialized using publicly known value IV2 (this is suﬃcient for the oracle
to be diﬀerent), and the query block is obtained by concatenation of C,
last message block Mlast, and the message length.
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2. Compression funtion
2. 1. Random Orale Model
Random oracle is a black-box supporting a query operation. For a new query it outputs
a random reply from a uniform distibution, and for a repeated query it outputs the
previous reply.
Some explain this as an Elf with a notepad sitting inside the blackbox performing the
following operation.
Everytime a new query comes, he looks it up in his notepad. If he ﬁnds the query,
he replies with the value coresponding to the query. If he does not ﬁnd the query, he
ﬂips a coin for every bit of the output, repiles with such an output, and writes the
pair query ! output into his notepad.
2. 2. Birthday paradox
Birthday paradox states that at least two numbers in a collection of n random integers
drawn from a uniform distribution with range (1, N) are the same with probability
p(n;N).
The name is derived from the following special case: In a group of at least 23 randomly
chosen people, the probability that some pair will have the same day of birthday is
more than 50%.
In this thesis, the birthday paradox will also be referred to as an event, that there
is a non-empty intersection of two sets of integers of size n and m with probability
p(n;m;N).
This would be a probability that in a group large enough there is a male and a female
having birthday the same day.
The picture shows a diﬀerence between one collection and two sets.
In the one collection case, the probability p(n;N) = 1 
Qn−1
k=1 (1 
k
N
)  1  e−
n∗(n−1)
2N .
1  k
N
is a probability that a new integer diﬀers from all (k) integers in the collection.
For n =
p
2N , p(n;N)  1  e
−1
2
 0.4
In the two sets case, the probability p(n;m;N) = 1  
Qn
k=1 (1 
1
m
) = 1   (1   1
m
)n,
p(n;m;N) = e−
nm
N , p(n;n;N)  1  e−n
2
.
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1   1m is a probability that a new integer in ﬁrst set diﬀers from all integers in the
other set.
For n = m =
p
N , p(n;n;N)  1  e−1  0.63
An extended results on birthday attack can be found in [9].
2. 2. 1. Generalized birthday paradox
This attack was introduced by Wagner in [30]. It is a generalization of birthday para-
dox for two sets. Note that the case for two sets explained above can be interpreted as
ﬁnding s1 2 X1, and s2 2 X2, such that s1  s2 = 0. The the solution (s1, . . . , sk) can
be found in Θ(2
n
2 ) steps, and it exists with a good probability iﬀ jX1j  jX2j  2
n.
Generalized birthday paradox for k sets is ﬁnding s1 2 X1, . . ., sk 2 Xk, such that
s1 . . .sk = 0. The solution exists for jX1j . . .jXkj  2
n with a good probability,
however an algorithm than would make less than Θ(2
n
2 ) steps was an open problem.
Wagner showed in [30] an algorithm, which ﬁnds a solution of s1 2 X1, s2 2 X2, s3 2
X3, s4 2 X4 for jXij = 2
n
3 in O(2
n
3 ) steps.
The algorithm can be constructed for + operation as well. Such an algorithm solves
so called k-sum problem, which can be used to solve a discrete logarithm problem.
The reader should refer to [30] for further details.
Attack using generalized birthday paradox can be found in [32].
2. 3. Introdution to ompression funtions
Ideal compression function is a pseudo-ranndom function 2m ! 2h with random oracle
properties. In praxis only indistinguishability from random oracle is required. The
concept of indistinguishability and author’s contribution can be found in the following
chapter.
Let us concentrate on requirements, which any compression function should meet, and
how can we built such a function.
The compression function should meet the following
 function is surjective

8x 2 Rng : jy : C(y) = xj = 2m−h, where m is message block length, h is a
length of hash value, and C is the compression function.
2. 3. 1. Preimage resistance
This property is called one-way ness in complexity theory. The existence of one-way
function is an open problem, which is equivalent to P = NP . The proof can be found
in [24].
f is one-way iﬀ
 for every x 2 Dom, f(x) can be computed in polynomial time
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 for any y 2 Rng any polynomial time bounded algorithm A will output x such
that y = f(x) with negligble probability.
For a random oracle, it holds that the preimage can be founnd only by making a
correct query. This event occurs with probability 2−h, and such a propety is also
required from any compression function.
2. 3. 2. Second preimage resistance
For any random oracle it holds, that a second preimage can only be found by making
a correct query. This event occurs with probability 2−h, and such a propety is also
required from any compression function.
2. 3. 3. Collision resistance
For any random oracle it holds that collision can be found using birthday paradox in
2
h
2 queries with approximately 50% probability .
Compression functions are usually based on a block cipher, pseudorandom generator
or some diﬃcult problem in information theory.
Block cipher based compression function are the most usual, and they are described
in many other papers. They are often divided as follows:
Expliit onstrutions of ompression funtion
Most common constructions are:
 Davies-Meyer construction
E
IV
M
 Miyaguchi-Preneel construction
EIV
M
The list of all secure constructions based on block cipher can be found in [2].
These constructions are secure in the random oracle model, which follows from
[21]. This was pointed out by Klima in [34] that using an ordinary block cipher in
any of these constructions is not secure. Further explanation of these principles
can be found in [25], and in [26].
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Impliit onstrutions of ompression funtion
These constructions are usually based on Davies-Meyer, or Miyaguchi-Preneel con-
struction. The underlying building block is either similar to a block cipher or it is a
block cipher build only for the use in the compression function.
 MD5/SHA
 Whirlpool, Maelstrom-0
 Radio-Gatun
 Hash Double Net (which is based on principles of Special Block Cipher from
[34])
2. 4. Pseudo-random number generator based funtions
2. 4. 1. Introduction
Some proposals for a new hash function are based on pseudo-random number genera-
tor. The general construction is to initialize a pseudo-random number generator with
an IV and message block. Make a few steps, apply a one-way function and trim the
output.
2. 4. 2. RC4-Hash
Basic properties
This hash function is based on RC4 key schedule algorithm, and was proposed in [17].
RC4 algorithm and its key scheduling is studied for a long time. Since the attack
against hash function based on RC4 will lead to an attack against RC4 algorithm, we
have a good security analysis.
RC4-hash is a wide-pipe hash introduced by Lucks in [15]. Therefore it resists to
generic attacks such as [4][5][6][7].
The key schedule algorithm in RC4:
K is a secret key of length κ bytes.
S is a state vector of RC4 of length 28 bytes,
it is a permutation S ∈ SN
procedure RC4-KSA(K) : RC4 Key Schedule algorithm
for i=0 to 28 − 1
S[i] = i
for i=0 to 28 − 1
j = j + S[i] +K[i mod κ]
swap(S[i], S[j])
κ is the size of the secret key in bits
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S ∈ SN is a state vector of RC4 of length 28 bytes.
i = 0
j = 0
procedure RC4-PRBG() : RC4 Pseudo-Random Bit Generator
i = i + 1 mod N
j = j + S[i] mod N
swap(S[i], S[j])
return S[(S[i] + S[j])]
Therefore the inner state of RC4 random byte generator is log2 (jSj  jij  jjj) =
log2 (2
8!  (28)2)  1700.
The key schedule algorithm seems to be a good pseudo random generator.
RC4-KSA attacks
RC4-hash algorithm
The hash algorithm consists of 3 steps.
 padding
 iteration
 post-processing
Iteration The compression function of RC4-hash is based on RC4-KSA.
X is a message block
(S,j) is initialization vector
procedure C((S,j), X) : RC4-Hash Compression function
for i=0 to 28 − 1
j = j + S[i] +X [r(i)]
swap(S[i], S[j])
return (S, j)
r : 2256 → 264
r | [i,i+63] : 264 → 264 is bijection for i ∈ {0, 64, 128, 192}
Post-processing Let (St,jt) be the last chaining value. We produce a hash by ap-
plying two functions.
RC4− hashl = HBGl(OWT (S0 ◦ Sj , j))
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Where OWT is believed to be a one-way transformation
procedure OWT((S,j)) : One-Way Transformation of RC4-Hash
perm1 = S
for i=0 to 29 − 1
j = j + S[i]
swap(S[i], S[j])
perm2 = S
return (perm1 ◦ perm2 ◦ perm1, j)
procedure HBGl((S,j)) : Hash Byte Generation Algorithm
for i=0 to l
j = j + S[i]
swap(S[i], S[j])
out[i] = S[S[i] + S[j]]
return out
RCHl(M1, M2, ..., Mn) = HBGl(OWT (C(...(C(C(S
IV , M1), M2), ...),Mn)))
RC4-hash - choice of initialization vector
Since RC4 cipher has some weak keys, which would reduce the size of internal state,
the chosen IV should not be one of them. For more information reﬀer to the original
article.
2. 5. DiÆult problem based ompression funtions
2. 5. 1. VSH
Very smooth hash was proposed by Contini, Lenstra, and Steinﬁeld at Eurocrypt
2006. This function is designed to be provably secure against ﬁnding collisions under
an assumption factoring of big integers is diﬃcult. The VSH function cannot be used as
an instance of random oracle, and therefore strictly speaking it is not a hash function.
VSH algorithm
procedure VSH(m) :
l = |m| length of the message in in bits
k = block length
mi is i
th bit of message
L =
⌈
l
k
⌉
number of blocks of message
li ∈ {0, 1} such that l =
∑k
l=1 li2
i−1
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mi = 0 for l < i < Lk padding of last block
define mLk+i = li for 1 ≤ i ≤ k padding with message length
x0 = 1
for j = 0 to L
xj+1 = x
2
j
∏k
i=1 p
mjk+i
i mod n
return xL+1
Collision resistance of VSH
VSH was built on a hard problem which arises in factoring of large numbers using
NFS (Number Field Sieve) algorithm.
procedure QS basic(N) :
find x2 ≡ y2 mod N , where x2 and y2 are non-trivial
gcd(x2 − y2, N) / N
There is no eﬃcient algorithm to ﬁnd such x2 and y2, and it is supposed there is
no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which would ﬁnd such pair x2, y2 with a
non-negligable probability.
Definition 2.1: VSSR - Very Smooth number nontrivial modular Square Let N be
the product of two unknown primes and let k < (logn)c.
VSSR problem: Given N , ﬁnd x 2 Z∗N such that x
2

Qk
i=0 p
ei
i .
Theorem 2.2: Collision resistance of VSH
Finding a collision in VSH is as hard as solving VSSR.
Proof: Let m, m′ be a collision in VSH. l, l′ bitlengths, and L, L′ number of blocks
of m, m′.
Since m and m′ collide m 6= m′ and xL+1 = x
′
L′+1 = digest
Letm[j] be them[j] = (mjk+i)
k
i=1, and t  L is the largest index such that (xt,m[t]) 6=
(x′t,m
′[t]), ie. (xj ,m[j]) = (x
′
j ,m
′[j]) for t < j < L+ 1.
1. l = l′
(xt)
2

Qk
i=1 p
mtk+i
i  (xt)
2

Qk
i=1 p
m′
tk+i
i mod N
Denote
∆ = fi : mtk+i = m
′
tk+i, 1  i  kg
∆10 = fi : mtk+i = 1,m
′
tk+i = 0, 1  i  kg
Then
h
xt
x′t

Q
i∈∆10
pi
i2

Q
i∈∆ pi mod N
 ∆ 6= ; ) collision gives a solution to VSSR.
 ∆ = ; ) x2t  x
′2
t mod N Since m 6= m
′, we know t  1
15
 xt 6 x
′
t mod N , VSSR is solved by factoring N ,
gcd(x2t   x
′2
t , N) is a factor of N.
 xt  x
′
t mod N ) xt   x
′
t mod N ,
and from the deﬁnition of t xt 6= x
′
t.
From xt   x
′
t mod N )
xt
x′t
  1 mod N
 1

Q
i∈∆10
pi
2
 1 mod N ) it solves VSSR
2. l 6= l′, since xL+1 = x
′
L′+1,

xL
x′
L′
2

Qk
i=1 p
l′
i
−li
i
Since jl′i   lij = 1 for at least one i, it solves VSSR
Creating collisions
Finding collisions is diﬃcult if and only if the factorization of N is unknown.
Denote ei =
PL
j=0mjk+i2
L−j for 1  i  k, then VSH(m) =
Qk
i=1 p
ei
i .
Let φ(N) be an Euler function. Then for any a, t, it holds atφ(N)  1 mod N .
VSH(m) =
Qk
i=1 p
ei
i =
Qk
i=1 p
ei+tiφ(N)
i = VSH(m
′)
But such collisions reveals φ(N), and therefore it reveals the factorization of N .
Preimage resistance of VSH
Since the function is collision resistant, the attacker is required to make at least Ω(2
n
2 )
computations. The following algorithm for ﬁnding a preimage, which requires Θ(2
n
2 ),
makes use of multiplicative property in time-memory tradeof attack.
H(x ^ y)H(x _ y)  H(x)H(y) mod n
H(y) = H(x)−1H(x ∧ y) H(m) mod n; we will choose x, y such that x ∧ y = 00...0,
this holds for x = x′ || 00...0, and y = 00...0 || y′, where |00...0| = n2
procedure Preimage(H(m)) :
for 0 ≤ x′ < 2n2
x = x′ || 00...0
insert into table H(x)−1H(x ∧ y)H(m)
for 0 ≤ y′ < 2n2
y = 00...0 || y′
search in table H(y)
if match found return x || y
The attack has both time and space complexity of O(2
n
2 ), and since we know the
attack has a complexity of at least Ω(2
n
2 ) the preimage attack has complexity of
Θ(2
n
2 ) - under the assumption VSSR problem has a complexity of at least Ω(2
n
2 ).
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VSH-DL : Discrete Logarithm variant of VSH
Definition 2.3: VSDL - Very Smooth number Discrete Log Let p, q be primes with
p = 2q + 1 and let k  (log p)c.
VSDL problem: Given p, ﬁnd integers e1, e2, . . . , ek such that 2
e1

Qk
i=2 p
ei
i mod p
with jeij < q for i = 1, 2, . . . , k and at least one of ei 6= 0.
procedure VSH DL(m) :
p is S-bit prime p = 2q + 1, for q prime
k fixed integer, number of small primes
L ≤ S − 2
l = |m| length of the message in in bits
m is Lk-bit message
mi is i
th bit of message, i ∈ {1, . . . , Lk}
x0 = 1
for j = 0 to L− 1
xj+1 = x
2
j ×
∏k
i=1 p
mjk+i
i mod p
return xL
This section contains a summary of [16] and [22]. The main purpose for this section
was presenting a hash function with some provable secure properties.
2. 5. 2. MQ-HASH
The security of this hash function is based on the diﬃculty of solving randomly chosen
set of multivariate quadratic equations.
Such a function is supposed to be preimage resistant, because solving of multivariate
quadratic equations is an NP-hard problem.
Theorem 2.4: collisions in MQ equations (from [10])
Let Q be a tuple of e quadratic equations f1, . . . , fe in u variables over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F .
For every value δ = (δ1, . . . , δu), it is possible to give, with time complexity O(eu
2),
a parametrized description of the set of inputs x = (x1, . . . , xu) and y = (y1, . . . , yu)
colliding though Q and such that y   x = δ, if any.
Proof:
Given δ, one computes a linear system Lδ(z) = 0 in the indeterminate z, where Lδ
is the aﬃne mapping deﬁned by Lδ : z ! Q(z + δ)   Q(z). Thus, any colliding pair
(x, y) = (x, x + δ) for Q with prescribed diﬀerence δ translates into a solution x of a
linear system, and any standard algorithm for solving linear system recovers the set
of solutions of the collision equation Q(z) = Q(z + δ)
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Algorithm for collision in MQ equation
Eq1 : f1(z1 + δ1, z2 + δ2, . . . , zu + δu)  f1(z1, z2, . . . , zu) = 0
=
Pu
i=1
Pu
j=1 a1,i,j(zi + δi)(zj + δj) 
Pu
i=1
Pu
j=1 a1,i,j(zi)(zj)
=
Pu
i=1
Pu
j=1 a1,i,jδjzi +
Pu
i=1 a1,i,jδiδj
Eq2 : f2(z1 + δ1, z2 + δ2, . . . , zu + δu)  f2(z1, z2, . . . , zu) = 0
=
Pu
i=1
Pu
j=1 a2,i,jδjzi +
Pu
i=1 a2,i,jδiδj
...
Eqe : fe(z1 + δ1, z2 + δ2, . . . , zu + δu)  fe(z1, z2, . . . , zu) = 0
=
Pu
i=1
Pu
j=1 ae,i,jδjzi +
Pu
i=1 ae,i,jδiδj
It gives us e equations of u variables, which can be solved using Gauss elimination in
O(eu2).
Setting (x, y) = (z, z + δ) gives a collision (f1(x), . . . , fe(x)) = (f1(y), . . . , fe(y)).
0
B
B

Pu
j=0 a1,1,jδj
Pu
j=0 a1,2,jδj . . .
Pu
j=0 a1,u,jδj
Pu
j=0 a2,1,jδj
Pu
j=0 a2,2,jδj . . .
Pu
j=0 a2,u,jδj
...
...
. . .
...
Pu
j=0 ae,1,jδj
Pu
j=0 ae,2,jδj . . .
Pu
j=0 ae,u,jδj
1
C
C
A
0
B
B

z1
z2
...
ze
1
C
C
A
=
0
B
B

 
Pu
i=1 a1,i,jδiδj
 
Pu
i=1 a2,i,jδiδj
...
 
Pu
i=1 ae,i,jδiδj
1
C
C
A
Using Gauss elimination algorithm, we can ﬁnd z, such that the equations hold. Gauss
elimination algorithm run in time O(eu2), and returns a set of solutions for such δ.
The set is empty, if a collision for such δ does not exist.
Compression function of MQ-HASH
As we have seen in previous theorem, MQ-Hash has to be built so that it is not a
plain multivariate quadratic equation. If we have a hash function containing a plain
multivariate quadratic equation for each bit of an output, the hash function itself does
not contain any message expansion.
The expansion function for MQ-Hash is another multivariate quadratic equation.
The MQ-HASH compression function can be deﬁned as g Æ f , where
f : Fm+n ! F r; x = (c1, . . . , cn, b1, . . . , bm)! f(x) = (f(x1), . . . , f(xr))
g : F r ! F n; η = (η1, . . . , ηr)! g(η) = (g1(η), . . . , gn(η))
MQ-HASH: vi = g Æ f(vi−1,Mi)
MQ-HASH(M1jjM2jj . . . jjMn) = g Æ f(. . . (g Æ f(g Æ f(v0,M1),M2)) . . . ,Mn)
This section presented a hash function with some provable secure properties. The only
source for this section was [10]. The reader is encouraged to refer to [18], and [11] to
understand preimage attacks against some constructions.
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3. Authentiation shemes
3. 1. COMP-128 hash funtion
GSM authentication is a standard challenge-response protocol. Authentication ser-
ver sends via base station (BS) a random challenge to a new mobile station (MS).
Both authentication server and mobile station compute a response using so called A3
algorithm, the challenge, and secret key. Mobile station sends the response to the au-
thentication server. The server compares the received value with the computed value,
and authenticates the mobile station if and only if values are same.
The A3 algorithm must not leak any information about the secret key. A3 algorithm
was not required to be collision resistant, because in general a collision is not an attack
against authentication protocol. A3 algorithm is performed on SIM card so that the
secret key never leaves the chip.
A3 and A8 algorithms in GSM were implemented using COMP-128 hash function.
The COMP-128 algorithm was not publicly known until 1997, when an incomplete
speciﬁcation appeared on usenet. The remaining parts were reversed engineered soon.
After that cryptologists pointed out there is a ﬂaw (called narrow pipe) in the algo-
rithm. The attacker can produce collisions by changing only a few bytes of an input,
and such collisions leaks information about the secret key.
The occurence of a speciﬁc collision at the beginning of the algorithm, and such
collision propagates into the digest. Since the collision in hash implies with high
probability a collision in the narrow pipe for speciﬁc inputs, one can use a collision in
narrow pipe to reconstruct two bytes of the secret key.
|Secret Key| = 128 bits
|Challenge| = 128 bits
procedure A3(Secret Key, Challenge) : algorithm on SIM card
Y = COMP128(Secret Key, Challenge)
return [Y ]310
|Secret Key| = 128 bits
|Challenge| = 128 bits
procedure A8(Secret Key, Challenge) : algorithm on SIM card
Y = COMP128(Secret Key, Challenge)
return [Y ]9632
|Challenge| = 128 bits
procedure Authenticate Mobile(Challenge) : authentication algorithm interface
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Secret Key = read from SIM (does not leave SIM card)
return A3(Secret Key, Challenge) . . . computed by SIM card
procedure Authenticate Provider() : authentication algorithm at a provider
Secret Key = read from database
Challenge = Random()
if Authenticate Mobile(Challenge) = A3(Secret Key, Challenge)
return ok
else
return failure
COMP-128 algorithm.
|Secret Key| = 128 bits
|Challenge| = 128 bits
X is an input array of length 32 bytes
procedure COMP128(Secret Key, Challenge) : cryptographic part of the algorithm
X [16 . . .31] = Challenge
for j = 0 to 7
X [0 . . . 15] = Secret Key
COMP128 Compress(X)
Form bits from bytes = convert 32 4-bit numbers to 16 8-bit numbers
if j 6= 7 Permutation
Y = compressed 16 bytes output of COMP128(X) into 12 bytes
return Y
table T0 is a function T0 : 2
9 → 28
table T1 is a function T1 : 2
8 → 27
table T2 is a function T2 : 2
7 → 26
table T3 is a function T3 : 2
6 → 25
table T4 is a function T4 : 2
5 → 24
X is an input array of length 32 bytes
procedure COMP128 Compress(X) : cryptographic part of the algorithm
for j = 0 to 4
for k = 0 to 2j − 1
for l = 0 to 24−j − 1
m = l + k ∗ 25−j
n = m+ 24−j
y = ( X [m] + 2 ∗X [n]) mod 29−j
z = (2 ∗X [m] + X [n]) mod 29−j
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X [m] = Tj[y]
X [n] = Tj[z]
3. 1. 1. Narrow pipe attack
The name of the attack suggests there is a trail in the algorithm, such that only a
few bits of the output may cause a collision on a few bits (somewhere) during the
algorithm. If the attacker sets bits outside the narrow pipe same for both inputs, a
collision in the narrow pipe propagates throughout the algorithm into the digest.
The narrow pipe in COMP128 is at the beginning of COMP128 Compress. The at-
tacker forces a collision in the ﬁrst run of COMP128 Compress (which is repeated 8
times). The collision propagates to the digest, and the attacker ﬁnds the secret key
(using brute force search on bits of narrow pipe), which leads to this collision.
Graphical representation of COMP128 Compress the algorithm.
procedure COMP128 Compress(X) : cryptographic part of the algorithm
level0 :
for l = 0 to 15
m = l
n = m+ 24
X [m] = T0[( X [m] + 2 ∗X [n]) mod 29]
X [n] = T0[(2 ∗X [m] + X [n]) mod 29]
level1 :
for k = 0 to 1
for l = 0 to 7
m = l + k ∗ 24
n = m+ 23
X [m] = T1[( X [m] + 2 ∗X [n]) mod 28]
X [n] = T1[(2 ∗X [m] + X [n]) mod 28]
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level2 :
for k = 0 to 3
for l = 0 to 3
m = l + k ∗ 23
n = m+ 22
X [m] = T2[( X [m] + 2 ∗X [n]) mod 27]
X [n] = T2[(2 ∗X [m] + X [n]) mod 27]
level3 :
for k = 0 to 7
for l = 0 to 1
m = l + k ∗ 22
n = m+ 21
X [m] = T3[( X [m] + 2 ∗X [n]) mod 26]
X [n] = T3[(2 ∗X [m] + X [n]) mod 26]
level4 :
for k = 0 to 15
m = k ∗ 2
n = m+ 1
X [m] = T4[( X [m] + 2 ∗X [n]) mod 25]
X [n] = T4[(2 ∗X [m] + X [n]) mod 25]
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COMP128 Compress the algorithm.
Graphical representation of narrow pipe.
Bytes i, i+ 8, i+ 16, i+ 24 in level1 function depends only on bytes i, i+ 8, i+ 16,
i+ 24 of the input array X. Bytes i, i+ 8 are bytes of a secret key, bytes i+ 16, and
i+ 24 are bytes of a challenge. Bytes i+ 16, and i+ 24 are varied until a collision is
found. Other bytes in the challenge are ﬁxed (but random).
Since T1 function is T1 : 2
8
! 27 there are collisions. The probability of a collision
can be computed using a formula for birthday paradox. If all but two bytes: i + 16,
i+24 are ﬁxed (a = 16 bits), then all but 4 outputs i, i+8, i+16, i+24 of function
level1 are constant, the output of T1 table is a 7-bit number. Therefore the length
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of the pipe (number of bits that can be varied) is b = 4  7 = 28 bits. According to
birthday paradox, the probability of a collision is 1  e
−n2
2∗m , where n = 2a and m = 2b.
And after substitution 1  e
−(216)2
2∗228 = 0, 9997. An average number of tests required to
obtain a collision is E =
p
pi  m2 , E =
q
pi  2
28
2 = 2
14.326 = 20538. Since we can only
see the collision at the end of computation, we need to know what is the probability
a collision from COMP128 is the collision in level2. The probability of a collision in
A3 hash function after E queries is 1   e
−(214.326)2
2∗232 = 0, 0479. This gives us enough
conﬁdence, the collision is at level2. For more conﬁdence, we can use the output from
A8 algorithm. It gives us 1  e
−(214.326)2
2∗232+64
 3  10−21  0 probability of a collision.
Once a collision is found it is easy to recover the secret key using brute force search.
procedure CollisionSearch(i) : search for a collision for ith byte
for t = 0 to 127
challengenew[t] = Random() - held fixed for all bytes but i
th and i+ 8th
for j = 0 to 255
for k = 0 to 255
challengenew[i] = j
challengenew[i+ 8] = k
response = COMP128(challengenew, key)
challengeold = search in database(response)
if challengeold 6= null
return (challengenew, challengeold)
else
add to database((response, challengenew))
procedure KeySearch(chall1, chall2, i) : recover i
th byte of secret key from collision
for t = 0 to 127
key[t] = 0 - only bytes i and i+ 8 are important for key recovery
for j = 0 to 255
for k = 0 to 255
key[i] = j
key[i+ 8] = k
if COMP128(chall1 || key ) = COMP128(chall2 || key)
return (key[i], key[i+ 8])
return failure collision was not in the second round
procedure CloneSim() : recover the secret key from SIM
for i = 0 to 7
(challengenew, challengeold) = CollisionSearch(i)
(key[i], key[i+ 8]) = KeySearch(chall1, chall2, i)
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return key
3. 1. 2. Partitioning attack
There is also a side channel attack (called partitioning attack) which requires  210
queries in non-adaptive version and 8 queries in adaptive version.
The attack is quite simple. The table T0 has size 2
9. Since addressing is often 8-bit, the
table T0 is implemented as T00 and T01. One can distinguish which table is accessed
using side-channel such as diﬀerential power analysis or electromagnetic emission.
Since the access to the table depends directly on bytes of secret key and challenge,
one can distinguish, whether x[i]  28 or x[i] > 28. Using binary search (adaptively
chosen queries), one can distinguish the value of byte x[i] in 8 = log2 2
8 queries. Non-
adaptive mode requires much more queries, so that the probability one can distinguish
the bit is high enough. Moreover, we can perform such search in parallel on all bits of
the secret key.
Table T0 is a function T0 : 2
9
! 28, which is often implemented using T00 : 2
8
! 28,
T01 : 2
8
! 28
level0 :
for l = 0 to 15
m = l
n = m+ 24
M = ( X [m] + 2 ∗X [n]) mod 29
N = (2 ∗X [m] + X [n]) mod 29
// X [m] = T0[M ]
if (M < 28) X [m] = T00[M mod 2
8]
else X [m] = T01[M mod 2
8]
// X [n] = T0[N ]
if (N < 28) X [m] = T00[N mod 2
8]
else X [n] = T01[N mod 2
8]
Using side channel, one can distinguish whether if, or else branch was executed. Let
l be ﬁxed. X[m] is an unknown byte of secret key, X[n] = B is a known byte of
the challenge. Side channel gives the attacker information X[m] + 2 B mod 29 < 28,
2 X[m] + B < 28 mod 29. The attacker wants to distinguish the challenge byte B,
so that (2 X[m] +B) mod 29 < 28 and (X[m] + 2 B) mod 29  28 or the other way
round.
f(S,R) : 0  S + 2 R mod 29 < 28 ! 0
: 256  S + 2 R mod 29 < 512! 1
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g(S,R) : 0  2  S +R mod 29 < 28 ! 0
: 256  2  S +R mod 29 < 512! 1
Functions f(S, .), g(S, .) are connected function save for two points.
procedure distinguishPartitionl(R): using f
R = X [l+ 24] - byte of random challenge
S = X [l] - byte of secret key
// X [m] = T0[M ]
if ( (S + 2 ∗R mod 29) < 28)
return 0
else
return 1
procedure distinguishKeyl(): using f
Rorig = Random() - byte of random challenge
R = Rorig - byte of random challenge
prev8 = distinguishPartitionl(R)
if ( prev8 = 0) low = 0, high = 2
8
else low = 28, high = 29
for i = 7 downto 0
previ−1 = distinguishPartitionl(R + (−1)previ+1 − previ2i)
R = R+ (−1)previ+1 − previ2i
if ( previ = previ−1)
high = high − 2i
else ( previ 6= previ−1)
low = low + 2i
low ≤ 2S + Rorig < high holds in both cases, and high − low = 2i
After the algorithm, we have either
distinguishPartitionl(R) 6= distinguishPartitionl(R  1), or
distinguishPartitionl(R) 6= distinguishPartitionl(R + 1)
Having such R, we can distinguish S. Let us consider only one case, the rest is similar.
procedure distinguishKeyl(R): using f
part = distinguishPartitionl(R)
if ( part = 0)
0 ≤ 2S +R < 256 mod 29
256 ≤ 2S +R+ 1 < 512 mod 29
⇒ 256 ≤ 2S +R+ 1 < 257 mod 29
255 − R
2 ≤ S < 256 −R2 mod 28
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⇒ S = 255 − R2 mod 28
if ( part = 1)
0 ≤ 2S +R+ 1 < 256 mod 29
256 ≤ 2S +R < 512 mod 29
⇒ 0 ≤ 2S +R+ 1 < 1 mod 29
−1− R
2 ≤ S < −R2 mod 28
⇒ S = −1− R2 mod 28
We used 8 adaptive queries in distinguishKeyl(). Since we can do the measurement
parallel on all the bytes of secret key, we need only 8 adaptive queries to recover S.
For graphs and details on both adaptive and non-adaptive version of attack, the reader
sould refer to [12].
3. 2. SQUASH
This hash function was proposed by Adi Shamir at FCE 2008 [14]. The function
is to be used on RFID chips and other constrained devices in a challenge response
authentication protocol. Since the response is being computed on a constrained device,
the function itself has to be fast, easy to implement, and it should have as low memory
requirements as possible. SQUASH is to be used in a challenge response protocol only,
therefore the only hash function property important for this application is a preimage
resistance.
Security of any challenge response authentication scheme requires it is impossible to
deduce a key using a set of pairs (challenge, response), where challenges can be chosen
adaptively.
SQUASH is based on squaring modulo a composite number N .
The motivation comes from the Rabin encryption scheme.
N is a public parameter, N = pq, p, q prime numbers
m is a message to be encrypted
procedure Rabin encrypt(m, N) :
c = m2 mod N
return c
p, q prime numbers - private parameters, N = pq
c is a message to be decrypted
procedure Rabin decrypt(c, p, q):
m =
√
c mod pq
return m
Rabin encryption scheme is provably secure against ciphertext only attack under the
assumption that factoring of a composite N is diﬃcult.
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Algorithm for computing square root modulo a composite number N =
Q
peii , where
pi’s are known diﬀerent prime numbers, consists of Shanks-Tonelli algorithm for com-
puting square root modulo prime number (i.e. solving the congruence x2  a mod pi).
Then the Hensel lifting is used to lift the solution of x2  a mod pi to modulo
x2  a mod peii , and Chinese remainder theorem to combine solutions for diﬀerent
peii s to obtain a solution x
2
 a (mod
Q
peii ). The reader can refer to chapter
12.5 of [31] for further information. The diﬃculty of square rooting modN is equi-
valent to factoring of N . The algorithm would be generating a random number x
and computing y =
p
x2 mod N mod N , if x 6= y, then it holds that (x   y)/N
because x2  y2 mod N , i.e. x2   y2  0 mod N , (x   y)(x + y)  0 mod N )
(x  y)(x+ y)  aN .
Let S be a secret key known only by the chip and an authentication centre, and
R be a random challenge sent by the authentication centre to the chip. SQUASH
algorithm consists of a function M = Mix(S,R), and outputs a section of bits of
number M2 mod N .
The N in SQUASH is chosen as a composite number with an unknown factorisation.
Everyone can compute M2 mod N to produce a digest, but no one can compute
p
M mod N .
Notation:
n = logN .
For X = (xn−1, . . . , x0), 0  j < k  n denote [X]
k
j = (xk−1, . . . , xj−1).
Challenge response protocols usually use a secret key of length 64 bits and a challenge
of the same length. They are ”securely” mixed so that it is diﬃcult to compute the
secret key from adaptive challenges.
The challenge and the secret key are mixed together using a function Mix(S,R). The
authentication response is SQUASHS = [Mix(S,R)
2]kj , for k j = 64 and j =
n
2 
k−j
2 .
Squaring operation mod N ensures non-invertibility, but its algebraic nature (a+b)2 =
a2 + 2ab+ b2, (ab)2 = a2b2 creates weaknesses. These weaknesses should be overcome
by a good choice of the Mix function. Various choices of Mix will be discussed later
in this section.
Speedups
Using a good choice of modulus N one can lower the time and memory requirements
on the computational power of the chip. This is very important, since a low cost device
such as RFID chip usually suﬀers from having enough memory, computational power,
or energy to execute the algorithm.
α) choice of an easy to store modulus N
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1. consider a Mersenne number N = 2n   1, this number contains n   1
ones and no zero. Therefore we need to store only the number n, and this
requires storing logn = log logN instead of logN as usual.
2. consider a number N = 2n +1, this number contains two ones, one at the
beginning, and the other at the end of the number, and the rest of n   2
digits are zeroes. Therefore we can store n 2 instead of N , which requires
requires only log logN bits.
3. consider a number N = 2n + c, and c is ﬁxed. The minimum number of
bits required to store such number is log n+log c = log logN+log c, which
is less than logN for a small c.
β) choice of a modulus N such that modN is easy to compute
1. For the choice of a modulus N = 2n   1, consider a number in the
form a2n + b (mod 2n   1), where b < 2n. Since 2n  1 mod 2n   1,
a2n + b  a+ b (mod 2n   1).
2. For the choice of a modulus N = 2n + 1, consider a number in the
form a2n + b (mod 2n + 1), where b < 2n. Since 2n   1 (mod 2n + 1),
a2n + b   a+ b (mod 2n + 1).
The SQUASH proposal composite Mersenne numbers were suggested as a good choice
of N - both α1) and β1) are used to speed up the computation. The number n = 1277
was selected, because N = 21277 1 is a composite number for which the factorisation
is not known.
squaring operation in natural numbers
In this section X is a n-bit number.
Square(X) is an algorithm for multiplying of integer taught at basic school.
input X = (xn−1, ...., x0)
procedure Square(x): square in Z
carry = 0
for i = 0 to k
for j = 0 to i
carry = carry + xi ∗ xj
outi = carry mod 2
carry = carry / 2
return out
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The result of this algorithm is a number a  2n + b for some a, b. Now we need to
perform the squaring operation modN .
operation modulo 2n   1
Let us take a closer look on the squaring operation modulo N = 2n 1, then we build
an algorithm that performs squaring modulo N .
squaring modulo 2n   1
input x = (xn−1, ...., x0)
procedure Squash Square(x): square in Z2n−1
carry = 0
for j = 0 to n− 1
for v = 0 to n− 1
carry = carry + xv ∗ xj−v mod n
outj = carry mod 2
carry = carry / 2
return out
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Note that we need only n-bit output buﬀer, instead of 2n-bit buﬀer which would be
required by squaring operation in Z.
Generic proposal for SQUASH is [Mix(S,R)2]kj for a secure mixing functionMix(S,R).
Since only some bits of squaring operation are used as a response, we would like to
compute only the necessary bits of the response to save computational power of the
chip.
If we knew the correct carry at position j the Squash Square algorithm could be run
for bits used in the digest only. Moreover we can guess the carry with probability 2−s
if we run the algorithm for s so called safeguard bits before the digest window. See
the diagram below.
This gives us the complete SQUASH algorithm
S is a secret key
R is a random challenge
j is a lower index of output
k is a higher index of output
l is a length of output window
s is a length of carry safeguard
n is such that 2n − 1 is a hard to factor composite number
procedure SQUASHnS (R): square in Z2n−1
X = Mix(S,R)
j = n2 − l2
k = n2 +
l
2
carry = 0
for q = j − s to k
for v = 0 to n− 1
carry = carry + xv ∗ xq−v mod n
x = carry mod 2
carry = carry / 2
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if q ≥ low output x
Algoritmus 3.1:
Observation 3.1:
SQUASHS(R) outputs

Mix(S,R)2 mod N
k
j
with probability 1  1
2l
,
and

Mix(S,R)2 mod N
k
j
  1 with probability 1
2l
3. 2. 1. Security of SQUASH
The attacker can see only [Mix(S,R)2 mod N ]kj , while jMix(S,R)
2
j = n k   j.
If factorisation of N is known, it is easy to ﬁnd a square root. However, since only
a few bits of the number Mix(S,R)2 mod N is known to an attacker, they cannot
perform square root algorithm.
For a number a = [Mix(S,R)2 mod N ]kj , there are 2
n−k+j−1 numbers b, such that
[b2]kj = a. And b =Mix(S,R) only for one of them.
Therefore when factorisation of N is found, the security of SQUASH relies on the
diﬃculty of guessing the correct b.
Note: the attacker needs at least |S|k−j diﬀerent pairs (challenge, response) to have
enough information to distinguish the correct S.
SQUASH, SQUASH128
The paper [14] contained two proposals. SQUASH is a generic method to construct a
secure hash function for authentication schemes. This function uses a modulus 21277 1.
It is a composite number of an unknown factorisation. The Mix(S,R) function is not
speciﬁed for SQUASH .
SQUASH128 is constructed the same way. However its modulus is only 2
128
  1 the
factorisation of which is easy to ﬁnd using the advanced factoring algorithms such
as number ﬁeld sieve. SQUASH128 uses for Mix(S,R) a non linear feedback shift
register from GRAIN128 cipher.
Motivation for attacks.
Rabin encryption scheme is provably secure against ciphertext only attack. But the
attack model for SQUASH is diﬀerent. The attacker can deduce the secret key from
multiple pairs (challenge, response). They can wiretap not only a response but also
the challenge. Usually they can also communicate with the chip and send their own
challenges.
Insecure mix functions
This section explains an attack based on algebraic properties of squaring operation in
SQUASH . The attack is prevented by a good choice of the mix function.
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Let us start an analysis using simple insecure mix functions.
1. Mix+(S,R) = S +R
SQUASH+(R) =
[
Mix+(S, R)
2 mod N
]k
j
=
[
(S + R)2 mod N
]k
j
The secret key recovery algorithm is based on the fact that (S + R)2   S2 =
2SR + R2. Therefore, the attacker does not have to perform square rooting,
and they extract information about the secret key S from the diﬀerence of two
responses.
The following sections gives guidelines how to implement an easy algorithm to
distinguish the secret key S, and gives the proof of correctness of such algorithm.
The requirement of the algorithm is the fact, that the adversary is allowed to
send challenges to the chip.
The challenges sent by the adversary are 0, and 2i for i 2 [0, . . . , n 1]. We shall
recover bits of the secret key from the diﬀerence of responses SQUASH+(2
i) 
SQUASH+(0).
Auxiliary theorems
Theorem 3.2: [A]kj = [A mod 2
k+1]kj , for every A 2 Z+
Theorem 3.3: [A]kj = [A]
k
j mod 2
k−j+1, for every A 2 Z+
Definition 3.4: [A]kj = [A mod 2
k+1]kj , for every A 2 Z−
Theorem 3.5: [A +B]kj =
 
[A]kj + [B]
k
j + a

mod 2k−j+1, for every A,B 2 Z0+
for some a 2 f0, 1g
Proof:
Denote by ai the i-th bit of A, bi i-th bit of B, di i-th bit of A + B. Then
di = ai+ bi+ ci−1  2ci, for some ci 2 f0, 1g is such that di 2 f0, 1g and c−1 = 0.
The zero bit of [A+B]kj equals to aj + bj + cj−1   2cj .
The zero bit of
 
[A]kj + [B]
k
j + a

equals to aj + bj + a  2cj.
Let us choose a = cj−1. Then, the zero bit of [A+B]
k
j equals to aj+bj+cj−1 2cj,
the zero bit of
 
[A]kj + [B]
k
j + a

equals to aj + bj + cj−1   2cj , which gives us
the same carry cj in both cases.
The number [A + B]kj has k   j + 1 bits (including leading zeros), the number
 
[A]kj + [B]
k
j + a

can have more than k   j + 1 bits.
Therefore we take
 
[A]kj + [B]
k
j + a

mod 2k−j+1 to obtain the number with k 
j + 1 bits.
Theorem 3.6: [A aN ]kj = [A+a]
k
j , for every A 2 Z
0
+, and for every a 2 f0, 1, 2g
Proof:
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[A  aN ]kj =

(A  aN) mod 2k+1
k
j
=

(A  a(2n   1)) mod 2k+1
k
j
= [
 
A  a(2n   1) + a2n−k−12k+1

mod 2k+1]kj
= [(A  a(2n   1) + a2n) mod 2k+1]kj = [(A+ a) mod 2
k+1]kj = [A+ a]
k
j
Proof of correctness and explanation of the attack
Notation 3.7: ∆i = SQUASH+(2
i)  SQUASH+(0)
The following theorem allows the attacker to recover bits of the secret key from
the diﬀerence of two queries to the chip.
Theorem 3.8: For all i 2 Z, we have
 
2i+1S mod N
k
j
=

∆i  
 
22i mod N
k
j
  ci

mod 2k−j+1,
for some ci 2 f0, 1, 2, 3g
Proof: The following computation is performed in Z2k−j+1
∆i = SQUASH+(2
i)− SQUASH+(0)
=
[(
S + 2i
)2
mod N
]k
j
− [(S2 mod N)]k
j
=
[ ( (
S2 mod N
)
+
(
2i+1S mod N
)
+
(
22i mod N
)
mod N
) ]k
j
− [ (S2 mod N) ]k
j
=
[ (
S2 mod N
)
+
(
2i+1S mod N
)
+
(
22i mod N
) − aN ]k
j
− [ (S2 mod N) ]k
j
,
for some a ∈ {0, 1, 2}
=
[
S2 mod N
]k
j
+
[(
2i+1S mod N
)
+
(
22i mod N
) − aN ]k
j
− [ (S2 mod N) ]k
j
+ b,
for some a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, b ∈ {0, 1}, using (3.5).
=
[(
2i+1S mod N
)
+
(
22i mod N
) − aN ]k
j
+ b,
for some a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, b ∈ {0, 1}
=
[(
2i+1S mod N
)]k
j
+
[(
22i mod N
) − aN ]k
j
+ b+ c,
for some a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, b, c ∈ {0, 1}, using (3.5).
=
[(
2i+1S mod N
)]k
j
+
[(
22i mod N
)
+ a
]k
j
+ b+ c,
for some a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, b, c ∈ {0, 1}, using (3.6).
=
[(
2i+1S mod N
)]k
j
+
[(
22i mod N
)]k
j
+ [a]kj + b+ c+ d,
for some a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1}, using (3.5).
=
[(
2i+1S mod N
)]k
j
+
[(
22i mod N
)]k
j
+ b+ c+ d,
for some b, c, d ∈ {0, 1}, since [a]kj = 0 for a ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
=
[(
2i+1S mod N
)]k
j
+
[(
22i mod N
)]k
j
+ ci,
for some ci ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Observation 3.9:
If we use the algorithm (3.1) instead of squaring, we have
 
2i+1S mod N
k
j
= ∆i  
 
22i mod N
k
j
  ci mod 2
k−j+1,
for some ci 2 f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4g
Proof:
From (3.1), it holds SQUASH+(2
i)   SQUASH+(0) =
h
 
S + 2i
2
mod N
ik
j
 
c1  

S2 mod N
k
j
+ c2, c1, c2 2 f0, 1g.
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Observation 3.10:

2i+1(a+ 2n−i−1b) mod N

= b+ 2i+1a mod N , for N = 2n   1
The following theorem shows, the attacker can recover bit at any position q,
because they can choose i such that q 2 [j   i  1 mod n, . . . , k   i  1 mod n]
Theorem 3.11: 2i+1S mod N = S<<<i+1
The following theorem shows, that if we forget last few bits in (3.8), we can
reduce the diﬀerence to f0, 1g. Moreover, if the diﬀerence is either zero or one,
and the attacker knows a bit of the result, they can distinguish the diﬀerence.
Theorem 3.12:
For all i 2 Z, we have

2i+1S mod N
k
j+m
=

h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
m
  a

mod 2k−j−m+1, for a 2 f0, 1g, and 3  m < k   j
Proof:
From (3.8), we have
 
2i+1S mod N
k
j
= ∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
  ci mod 2
k−j+1,
for some ci 2 f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4g
Therefore

 
2i+1S mod N
k
j
k−j
m
=

∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
  ci mod 2
k−j+1
k−j
m
,
for some ci 2 f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4g
And since

[A]kj
k−j
m
=

A
k
j+m

2i+1S mod N
k
j+m
=

∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1  c′i mod 2
k−j+1
k−j
m
,
for some c′i 2 f0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5g

2i+1S mod N
k
j+m
=


∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1   c′i
k−j
m
,
for some c′i 2 f0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5g

2i+1S mod N
k
j+m
=

h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
m
  [c′i]
k−j
3   a

mod 2k−j−m+1,
for some c′i 2 f0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5g, a 2 f0, 1g
Since [c′i]
k−j
m = 0, for every c
′
i 2 f0, 1, 2, 3, 4g and m  3, we have
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2i+1S mod N
k
j+m
=

h 
∆i  
 
22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
m
  a

mod 2k−j−m+1, a 2 f0, 1g
The following theorems will be used to recover a single bit or multiple bits of
secret key.
Theorem 3.13:
Denote δi,cm the m-th bit of ∆i 

22i mod N
k
j
  c, and let C = f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g be
the set of all possible diﬀerences. Then if there is b 2 f0, 1g, such that δi,cm = b
for all c 2 C, then sj+m−i−1 mod n = b
Proof:
One of diﬀerences ci 2 f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4g is the correct one. If all of them lead to
the same value of the m-th bit, then the correct one leads to this value as well.
From theorem (3.8), the m-th bit of ∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
  ci is the m-th bit
of
 
2i+1S mod N
k
j
. The m-th bit of

2i+1S mod N
k
j
is the (m+ j)-th bit of
 
2i+1S mod N

. And from (3.11) this is the (m+ j  i  1 mod n)-th bit of S. If
the m-th bit of ∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
  ci is constant for all ci 2 f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4g,
then it equals to the m-th bit of
 
2i+1S mod N
k
j
The theorem (3.13) is used to recover a bit of the secret key only once. The value
of the recovered bit is then used in the following query to distinguish diﬀerence.
Therefore, the attacker can avoid usage of (3.13), and try all possible value of
bit sq. Only one of them would lead to the correct S.
Once the attacker recovers a single bit sq, they can recover bits sq+1, . . . , sk using
(3.12), and the following theorem.
Theorem 3.14:
Denote δi,cm them-th bit of
h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
3
 c, and
let C = f0, 1g be the set of all possible diﬀerences. Then if there is b 2 f0, 1g,
such that δi,cm = b for all c 2 C, then sj+m−i−1 mod n = b
Proof:
The proof follows the proof of (3.13).
Once the attacker knows the bit sq, they can use this bit to distinguish the
diﬀerence cj−q+3 (of another query) using the following theorems.
Theorem 3.15:

[S]k−ij−i
k−j−1
0
=

[S]k−i−1j−i−1
k−j
1
.
Proof:

[S]k−ij−i
k−j−1
0
= [S]k−i−1j−i and

[S]k−i−1j−i−1
k−j
1
= [S]k−i−1j−i
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Theorem 3.16: [ [S]k−ij−i ]
k−j−m
0 = [ [S]
k−i−m
j−i−m ]
k−j
m .
Proof:

[S]k−ij−i
k−j−m
0
= [S]k−mj−i and

[S]k−mj−i−m
k−j
m
= [S]k−mj−i
Theorem 3.17:
Let sq, the q-th bit of secret key S, be known. Then bits [q + 1 mod n, . . . , q +
k   j   3 mod n] can be recovered from ∆j−q+3
Proof:
First, let us ﬁnd i, such that j   i   1 = q   3 (mod n), which holds for
i = j   q + 2 (mod n), i.e. the known bit of secret key is at index three in
∆i  
 
22i mod N
k
j
 ci mod 2
k−j+1, for some ci 2 f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4g. It means,
it is at index zero in
h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
3
  c′i, for some c
′
i 2 f0, 1g.
Since the attacker knows the bit at position zero, they also know the diﬀerence
c′i. Bits of secret key can therefore be recovered using (3.12).
Theorem (3.14) can be used to recover at least one bit of secret key, if
h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
3
6= 0, or
h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
3
6= 2k−j−3.
In the following observations, we will discuss the remaining cases.
Observation 3.18:
If it holds for every i, that
h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
m
= 0,
for 3  m < k   j, the attacker knows that S = 000 . . . 00.
Proof:
Let the attacker try sq = 1, this will help them to recover cj−q+3 =  1. This
leads to si = 1 for all i 2 fj   q + 3, . . . , k   qg, since cj−q+3 =  1 and
h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
m
= 0.
Using (3.15) we can use the recovered bits of the secret key to distinguish another
diﬀerence cm =  1. At the end of the algorithm, we will recover S = 111 . . . 11 =
000 . . . 00 mod N .
Let the attacker try sq = 0, this will lead to S = 000 . . . 00 using the same
technique as above.
Observation 3.19:
If there is an l such that Xl = 2
k−j−3, then Xl+1 6= 2
k−j−3, and Xl+1 6= 0.
Proof:
If Xl = 2
k−j−3 then sk−l−1 mod n 6= sk−l−2 mod n. This will cause Xl+1 6= 0, and
Xl 6= 2
k−j−3.
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Secret key recovery
For every i, let us compute
Xi =
h 
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
+ 1

mod 2k−j+1
ik−j
3
, and store them in the
database. Let us ﬁnd Xl in database, Xl 6= 0 & Xl 6= 2
k−j−3. Using (3.14) let us
recover some bits of S. Using (3.15), and (3.12) for l+1 mod n, l+2 mod n, . . .
the attacker recovers all bits of S.
The only special case (3.18), which does not allow to distinguish any bit of secret
key for certain, can easily be tested.
The number Xl, such that Xl 6= 0 & Xl 6= 2
k−j−3, is used to recover at least one
bit of the secret key. Using (3.15), and (3.12) for l   1 the attacker can recover
another bit of secret key.
The algorithm to recover the secret key can be found on an enclosed CD.
The algorithm is based on an active adversary. However, sometimes only a pas-
sive adversary is allowed. This attack can be extended even to the passive ad-
versary, however, it is no longer such an easy task to obtain bits of the secret
key S from the SQUASH+(Ra)  SQUASH+(Rb).
2. Mix⊕(S,R) = S R
SQUASH⊕(R) =
[
Mix⊕(S, R)
2 mod N
]k
j
=
[
(S ⊕ R)2 mod N]k
j
The technique of secret key recovery algorithm is the same as for SQUASH+.
However, the attacker will recover either S, or (S xor 111 . . . 11).
The challenges are 0, and 2i for i 2 [0, . . . , n   1]. We shall recover bits of the
secret key from diﬀerence of responses SQUASH⊕(2
i)  SQUASH⊕(0).
The algorithm is based on two facts
 It holds either S  2i = S + 2i, or S  2i = S   2i.
 It holds (S +R)2   S2 = 2SR+R2.
It means that (S  2i)2   S2 = 2i+1S + 22i, or (S  2i)2   S2 =  2i+1S + 22i.
Therefore, the adversary can deduce a sequence of bits of either S or  S from
the diﬀerence SQUASH⊕(2
i)  SQUASH⊕(0).
The following theorems form, together with the theorems from the previous
section, the proof of correctness of the key recovery algorithm for SQUASH⊕.
Notation 3.20: ∆i = SQUASH⊕(2
i)  SQUASH⊕(0)
Notation 3.21: :X = X xor 111 . . . 11
Observation 3.22: Let m > k, for numbers [A mod (2m 1)]kj , [ A mod (2
m
 
1)]kj it holds [A mod (2
m
  1)]kj xor ([ A mod (2
m
  1)]kj ) = 111 . . . 11,
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Proof:
Denote A = (am−1, . . . , a0), and B = (:am−1, . . . ,:a0)
Then A+B mod (2m   1) = 111 . . . 11 mod (2m   1) = 0 mod (2m   1)
Theorem 3.23:
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
  c mod 2k−j+1 =

2i+1S mod N
k
j
, or
∆i  

22i mod N
k
j
  c mod 2k−j+1 =

2i+1(:S) mod N
k
j
for some c 2 f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g
Proof:
S  2i = S + 2i or S  2i = S   2i, the rest of the proof follows the proof of
theorem (3.8).
If S is such that S  2i = S + 2i, i.e. si = 0, then
∆i  
 
22i mod N
k
j
  c mod 2k−j+1 =
 
2i+1S mod N
k
j
If S is such that S  2i = S   2i, i.e. si = 1, then
∆i  
 
22i mod N
k
j
  c mod 2k−j+1 =
 
 2i+1S mod N
k
j
for some c 2 f 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g
From (3.22), we have
 
 2i+1S mod N
k
j
=
 
2i+1( S) mod N
k
j
=
 
2i+1(:S) mod N
k
j
Recover secret key from ∆is
From ∆0, we recover a sequence of bits of either S or :S using (3.13). Let m
be the lowest index of distinguished bit. The attacker recovered either [S]k−1m ,
or [:S]k−1m . Denote T0 the sequence of recovered bits.
From ∆−1, we recover a sequence of bits of either S or :S using (3.13). Let n be
the lowest index of distinguished bit. Then the attacker recovered either [S]kn,
or [:S]kn. Denote T−1 the sequence of recovered bits.
We do not know which bits we have recovered from ∆0 and ∆−1. However, we
know (from (3.15) ) that [S]k−1m , and [S]
k
n have a same sequence of bits, and that
[:S]k−1m , and [:S]
k
n have a same sequence of bits as well.
If there is an overlap between T0, and T−1, then we recovered bits of S (or bits of
:S) in both cases. If there is no overlap between T0, and T−1, then we recovered
bits of S in one case and bits if :S in the other case. Therefore there is overlap
between T0, and :T−1, and we can recover [S]
k
m, or [:S]
k
m from T0, and :T−1.
From ∆−2, we can ﬁnd [S]
k+1
m , or [:S]
k+1
m . And so on.
At the end of the algorithm, we get S ′ and S ′′. And it holds either S ′ = S, S ′′ =
:S, or S ′′ = S, S ′ = :S. Let us compute

S ′2 mod N
k
j
, and

S ′′2 mod N
k
j
.
One of them equals to SQUASH⊕(0). If both of them does, let us distinguish
the correct one using SQUASH⊕(2
i) for some i 2 f0, . . . , n  1g.
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Linear feedback shift register based mix functions
Linear feedback shift register takes a sequence of bits as an input and produces
a sequence of bits as an output. One step of LFSR can be expressed using
a matrix A. Linear feedback shift register performs l steps nad therefore the
transformation LFSR(X) = Al(X).
In the following section linear feedback shift register is referred to as LFSR.
3. MixLFSR+(S,R) = LFSR(S +R)
SQUASHLFSR+(R) = (LFSR(S + R))
2 mod N
Al(S +Ri) = A
l(S) + Al(Ri) = T +Xi.
SQUASHSLFSR+(R) = [(LFSR(S +R))
2 mod N ]kj
= [(Al(S +R))2 mod N ]kj
= [(Al(S) + Al(R))2 mod N ]kj
= [(T +X)2 mod N ]kj
= SQUASHT+(X)
Therefore the secret key of SQUASHSLFSR+ can be recovered using the same
method as SQUASH+. The challenges to be used are Ri = A
−l2i, R = A−l0.
Once we recover secret key T of SQUASH+, let us compute
A−lT = A−lAl(S) = S to recover secret key S of SQUASHLFSR+
4. MixLFSR||(S,R) = LFSR(SjjR)
SQUASHLFSR||(R) = [(LFSR(S || R))2 mod N ]kj
In this section SQUASH denotes SQUASHLFSR||.
The following text is only a suggestion, how the secret key S can be recovered,
if a LFSR and concatenation is applied in the mix function.
In this section, we suppose that jRj = jSj = n, and N = 22n   1.
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The MixLFSR||(S,R) = LFSR(SjjR) can be reduced to the previous case, since
SjjR = 2nS +R. Denote S ′ = 2nS.
Then MixLFSR||(S,R) =MixLFSR+(S
′, R) = LFSR(S ′ +R).
However, we cannot use the method suggested in the previous case, because that
case required that for every i there is a challenge Xi, such that LFSR(S+Xi) =
T + 2i (it held since jSj = jRj = jN j). But this requirement will not be met in
this case, since jSj = jRj = j
p
N j.
We will use a similar approach in this case to recover the secret key.
∆a,b = SQUASHLFSR||(S,Ra)  SQUASHLFSR||(S,Ra)
= [(LFSR(2nS +Ra))
2 mod N ]kj   [(LFSR(2
nS +Rb))
2 mod N ]kj
= [(LFSR(2nS) + LFSR(Ra))
2 mod N ]kj
  [(LFSR(2nS) + LFSR(Rb))
2 mod N ]kj
Denote T = LFSR(S), and
= [(2nT +Ra)
2 mod N ]kj   [(2
nT +Rb)
2 mod N ]kj
= [22nT 2 + 2RaT +R
2
a mod N ]
k
j   [2
2nT 2 + 2RbT +R
2
b mod N ]
k
j
Using (3.5), (3.6), 22nX  X (mod 22n   1), and the fact that for every 0 
a, b, c < N it holds a+ b+ c mod N = a+ b+ c  dN , for some d 2 f0, 1, 2g.
= [T 2 mod N ]kj + [2
n+1RaT mod N ]
k
j + [R
2
a mod N ]
k
j
  [T 2 mod N ]kj   [2
n+1RbT mod N ]
k
j   [R
2
b mod N ]
k
j + a,
for some a 2 f 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g
= [2n+1RaT mod N ]
k
j + [R
2
a mod N ]
k
j
  [2n+1RbT mod N ]
k
j   [R
2
b mod N ]
k
j + a,
for some a 2 f 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g
= [2n+1(Ra  Rb)T mod N ]
k
j + [R
2
a mod N ]
k
j   [R
2
b mod N ]
k
j + a,
for some a 2 f 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g
This gives us
∆a,b   [R
2
a mod N ]
k
j + [R
2
b mod N ]
k
j   a = [2
n+1(Ra  Rb)LFSR(S) mod N ]
k
j
for some a 2 f 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g,
Since we know bits of ∆a,b, Ra, and Rb, we can ﬁnd relations between bits of S.
Given many diﬀerent pairs Ra, Rb, we can ﬁnd bits of S.
However, Ra  Rb, has a domain size
p
N + 1, and not N . Therefore it may be
impossible to obtain relations for some bits of S.
Denote S? the unrecoverable part of the secret key, and S⋆, the recoverable part
of the secret key. We have S = S? + S⋆.
Moreover it holds,
∆a,b   [R
2
a mod N ]
k
j + [R
2
b mod N ]
k
j   a = [2
n+1(Ra  Rb)LFSR(S⋆) mod N ]
k
j
for some a 2 f 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g,
since there is no relation in ∆a,b   [R
2
a mod N ]
k
j + [R
2
b mod N ]
k
j for S?.
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The attacker cannot ﬁnd the S? using our technique, however, they can forge a
response to any challenge.
Forgery of a response
Let X be a new challenge from the authentication server,
and let

R,SQUASHLFSR||(S,R)

be a pair of a challenge, and the correspon-
ding response from the chip.
∆X = SQUASHLFSR||(S,X)  SQUASHLFSR||(S,R)
= [2n+1(X  R)LFSR(S⋆) mod N ]
k
j + [X
2 mod N ]kj
  [R2 mod N ]kj + a,
for some a 2 f 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3g
Since we know S⋆, we compute ∆X with probability
1
|{−4,−3,−2,−1,0,1,2,3}| =
1
8 .
The response to the challenge X is
SQUASHLFSR||(S,X) = ∆X + SQUASHLFSR||(S,R).
5. Mix||+(S,R) = LFSR(SjjS +R)
SQUASHLFSR|| +(R) = (LFSR(S || S + R))2 mod N
The initial state of register is SjjS +R =
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

s1
...
sn
s1 + r1
...
sn + rn
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
= T
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

s1
...
sn
r1
...
rn
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
.
For some matrix T . and si and ri are bits of S, R.
Al(SjjS +Ri) = A
lT (SjjRi).
This case can be solved using the same method as in the previous case, using a
diﬀerent LFSR transformation matrix B =
 
AlT
−l
.
SQUASHLFSR||(R) =

(LFSR(SjjR))2 mod N
k
j
=

Bl(SjjR) mod N
k
j
=

AlT (SjjR) mod N
k
j
=

Al(SjjS +R) mod N
k
j
= SQUASHLFSR||+(R)
3. 3. SQUASH128 proposal
The ﬁnal proposal of [14] is the following Mix function. jSj = jRj = 64 is a bitlength
of a secret key and a challenge.
Mix(S,R) = GRAINNLFSR128 (Sjj(S R))
SQUASH128 =
h
 
GRAINNLFSR128 (Sjj(S R))
2
i80
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where GRAINNLFSR128 is a non-linear feedback shift register used in GRAIN128 stream
cipher.
42
Let
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

b1
...
...
...
...
b128
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
=
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

s1
...
s64
s1  r1
...
s64  r64
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
GRAINNLFSR128 uses the following non-linear function:
bi⊕128 = bibi+26b56b91b96b3b67b11b13b17b18b27b59b40b48b61b65b68b84.
Note that 32 steps can be done simultaneously, and NLFSR can run both forward
and backward.
The register is clocked 512 times, while GRAIN register is clocked 256 times only. If
the register was clocked only 256 times, it would be feasible to ﬁnd a linear equation for
each bit xi of Mix(S,R) = (x1, . . . , x128) using contemporary computational power.
If we had such equations we could use a similar approach as in SQUASHLFSR||+ .
If the NLFSR could be approximated with some LFSR, the attacker could use the
previous case SQUASHLFSR||+, and generate responses.
Note that for R = (1, . . . , 1), it holds:
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

b1
...
...
...
...
b128
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
=
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

s1
...
s64
:s1
...
:s64
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
, and similary for any R.
This property can be used to reduce memory requirements of ﬁnding linear equations
for xi in Mix(S,R) = (x1, . . . , x128). However for a 512 steps of NLFSR the require-
ments are too high, even if the memory requirements of equations are reduced using
the following x&x = x, x :x = 1, x&:x = 0.
In another attack, one can try to ﬁnd some diﬀerential characteristic of Mix(S,R),
and follow the rey recovery of SQUASH⊕
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4. Generi attaks on iterative hash funtions
4. 1. Joux multiollision attak
A r-multicollision is a r-tuple of messages which hash to the same value.
If the hash function behaved like a random oracle, obtaining 2k-multicollision would
require 2k2
n
2 computations of hash/compression function (2
n
2 queries to a random
oracle to meet requirements of birthday paradox, 2k is a multiplication factor to
ensure the attacker can obtain 2k colliding messages).
However, Joux found a simple generic attack on an iterated hash function, that requi-
res only k2
n
2 computations of compression function.
The only requirement of Joux attack is a linear iteration of a random oracle using a
chaining value. Merkle-Damgard construction meets these requirements, and therefore
it is vulnerable to this attack. But even if the iteration is not linear and any message
block can be used up to k times, the attack can be extended to count such security
enforcements [4].
4. 2. Attak on iterative hash funtion
The hash function is constructed by iteration of a random oracle (compression function),
which takes two inputs: chaining value and message block. First chaining value is pu-
blicly known.
The computation of a hash function goes as follows: A random oracle is initialized
with a chaining value (the ﬁrst chaining value is publicly known initialization vector).
Then the function reads the ﬁrst message block and outputs a new chaining value;
and the iteration continues.
Since random oracles are vulnerable to birthday paradox attack (and this attack can-
not be prevented), it can be mounted to ﬁnd a collision on ﬁrst message block. The
birthday paradox attack takes approximately 2
n
2 queries to a random oracle (com-
putations of a compression function). This way the attacker obtains two diﬀerent
message blocks, and both of them transforms chaining value IV1 to IV2, which means
the attacker obtains a collision after the ﬁrst message block. Since the birthday para-
dox has no requirements on input chaining value (it has no requirements on a random
oracle), the birthday paradox can be used in the next step to obtain a collision after a
second message block. This way the attacker obtains two options for the ﬁrst message
block, and two options for the second message block, and therefore they obtain 22
diﬀerent 2-block messages, and all of them have the same hash. The birthday paradox
attack can be used again to obtain a collision on IV3 giving an attacker 2
3 diﬀerent
messages. From induction, the attacker obtains 2i messages after ith usage of birthday
paradox. Therefore the 2k-multicollision attack takes only k2
n
2 .
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The following diagram shows the attack. The arrows indicates the message block.
The circle represents a chaining value. The start point of the arrow is the old chaining
value, and the end point of the arrow is a new chaining value (produced by a random
oracle initialized with the old chaining value and using a message block as a query).
Both arrows have the same start point, because the old chaining value is the same for
both message blocks; and they have the same end point, because the random oracle
outputs the same chaining value for both message blocks (because they are found
using birthday paradox, so that this condition holds).
This attack was ﬁrst presented by Antoine Joux in [5].
4. 3. Attaks on strengthen onstrutions
Even though the attack is general, this basic variant can be easily prevented. Using a
birthday paradox attack, the attacker obtains two messages, such that
Random oracleIVi(M1) = Random oracleIVi(M2) holds. But it is very unlikely the
message blocks M1, M2 would collide on a diﬀerent random oracle. Using the ﬁrst
message block once again at the end of the message would prevent this attack (only
its basic variant).
A diﬀerent random oracle (processing the same message block) can be obtained by
message expansion (using message block more than once), because the random oracle
would be initialized using a diﬀerent chaining value and the following inequality holds
with a very high probability: Random oracleIVi 6= Random oracleIVj for i 6= j.
Another way to obtain a diﬀerent random oracle is using a diﬀerent class of ran-
dom oracles (this means a diﬀerent compression function - eﬀectively a diﬀerent hash
function).
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4. 3. 1. Concatenation of different hash functions
For a security improvement, the ﬁnal digest can be obtained by concatenation of two
or more hashes.
As discussed above, it is unlikely, that message blocks colliding on a random oracle
Oracle1 would collide on a random oracleOracle2 as well. Indeed birthday paradox can
be used on a larger random oracle (which is constructed by concatenation of outputs
of Oracle1 and Oracle2 - if this were the only possible attack, the construction would
be secure).
Joux presented in [5] another attack on this construction. Suppose F and G are iterated
hash functions with an output of nf and ng bits respectively, and nf  ng. The attacker
can create 2
ng
2 multicollision in ng2
nf
2 computations of F’s compression function. Since
they have 2
ng
2 diﬀerent messages, they can ﬁnd a collision from birthday paradox with
50% probability. c(f) (c(g)) denotes compression function of f (g).
The ﬁrst diagram shows a multicollision in f long enough, so that the attacker can
produce enough messages for birthday paradox and ﬁnd a collision in g. The second
diagram shows the collision; one colliding message is dashed line, the other one is
dotted line.
4. 3. 2. Concatenation and expansion of a message
Another security improvement might be an expansion of the message.
Expansion of a message means that a message block can be used more than once by
a hash function. As was discussed above, the basic variant of Joux attack cannot deal
with it.
The limitation of Joux attack is the fact that a pair of message blocks is bound to a
certain input chaining value. If the input chaining value is diﬀerent, message blocks
are likely to lead to diﬀerent chaining values.
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4. 4. Attak on ICE hash funtion
The security of combination of expansion and concatenation of diﬀerent hash function
seems to be better than a simple iterative construction (a message block is used many
times in diﬀerent hash functions; the output values of functions are concatenated to
form a digest - the message has to collide on every hash function), but Hoch and Sha-
mir presented in [4] an attack against both ICE (iterated, concatenated, expanded),
and TCE (tree based, concatenated, expanded) hash functions.
In a general case, the ICE hash function expands message blocks up to k times and
it can process the copies of a block anytime during the computation of a digest.
We will explain only a successive permutation case.
In this case the message is processed in k rounds. In every round the message is
permuted. The initialization vector for every round is a ﬁxed publicly known value
(this gives us a diﬀerent hash function for every round). The ﬁnal digest is obtained
by concatenation of all digests from rounds 1 to k.
A hash function in next paragraph is a simple case of iterated, concatenated and ex-
panded hash function F . It consists of three diﬀerent hash functions f1, f2, f3. Their
output is concatenated to form a ﬁnal digest of F . Each fi can use a diﬀerent permu-
tation of message blocks.
multicollision in f1
To create 2r-multicollision in F , an attacker has to generate a large multicollision in
f1, say 2
m-multicollision. They can use Joux multicollision attack. The expansion of
a message does not introduce any problems in this stage. Expanded message blocks,
which are already ﬁxed, are not used for multicollision. They can change only the
intermediate chaining value, not a number of multicollisions (and therefore they will
not inﬂuence the birthday paradox).
To obtain a multicollision in f2, the attacker has to deal with a fact that a hash
function is diﬀerent (sometimes only an initial chaining value of a hash function is
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diﬀerent). They can, however, use the Joux attack on concatenated hash function.
This attack will give them a smaller multicollision which will work for both f1 and f2.
ﬁnding a multicollision in f2 and f3
The attacker has a 2m-multicollision in f1. They produce 2 (from 2
n
2 ) messages by
ﬁxation of message blocks. If they ﬁnd such a multicollision for every group of n2 blocks,
they obtain a 2
m
n
2 -multicollision in f2. The reason why this works is straightforward.
Fixation of some blocks in multicollision in f1 does not change the hash of f1. There
is enough messages for an attacker to ﬁnd a collision in f2, and the colliding messages
can be obtained by ﬁxation of some blocks.
For f3 the collision is found in the same way. All possible paths over a group of
n
2
blocks will give the attacker 2
n
2 diﬀerent messages, and from birthday paradox one
pair of messages will hash to the same chaining value. In this case, the attacker choose
for every group which message (one from the pair - both of them collide in f2 ) will
be used in collision.
The general case can be reduced to a successive permutation case. For more info the
reader is referred to [4]. The reduction is based on the fact that for a long message,
the attacker can reduce a general case to the successive permutation case by ﬁxation
of some message blocks.
4. 5. Expandable message attak
4. 6. Expandable message
A technique similar to Joux multicollision, can be used to construct an expandable
message and execute a 2nd preimage attack. (α, β)-expandable message is a set of
messages which have a constant hash value in some interval (α, β), where α (β) is the
message length (number of message blocks).
4. 7. Usage of an expandable message
In chapter 1 a 2nd preimage attack on non-strengthen Merkle-Damgard construction
was mentioned (it works for long messages). The strengthen Merkle-Damgard con-
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struction adds a padding block which contains the message length. The padding
block is used as an instrument preventing 2nd preimage attack. Having an expan-
dable message the attack can be mounted on strengthen Merkle-Damgard, because
expandable message can be expanded to desired length, and therefore 2nd preimage
can be found in less than 2n.
4. 8. Example of an expandable message
4, 20-expandable message
The bigger rectangle is a not expanded message block, the small rectangles form an ex-
panded message block. The pair of not expanded message block and expanded message
block is referred to as expandable message block. f1, 2i+1g-expandable message block
leads to the same chaining value for both 1 and 2i + 1 length.
By concatenation of expandable blocks the attacker can obtain any message of length
2 (k, 2k+1 + k) with constant hash value.
4. 9. Building of an expandable message
As it was mentioned before, (k, 2k+1+k)-expandable message can be constructed using
k f1, 2i+1g-expandable message blocks for i 2 (1, k). The message of a desired length
l is constructed by expanding ith block iﬀ the number l   k has 1 on ith position in
binary representation.
message of length 11 built from 4, 20-expandable message
4. 9. 1. Building of an expandable block
f1, 2i+1g-expandable message block can be constructed using a birthday paradox. The
attacker creates two sets of chaining values of size 2
n
2 . They generate the messages
(do not have to be random - because the output of random oracle will be random
anyway) of length 1 and 2i+1 blocks and obtain two messages of diﬀerent length that
lead to the same chaining value (from birthday paradox).
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The attacker creates two sets of pairs (message block Mi, chaining value Ci+1) such
that Ci+1 = OracleCi(Mi,0).
Set S0 contains pairs (Mi,0, Ci+1), where Mi,0 is a non-expanded message block; set
S1 contains pairs (Mi,1, Ci+1), where Mi,1 is an expanded message block.
Because chaining values Ci+1 are random (regardless the randomness of Mi - the
value is an output from random oracle), if sets S0 and S1 are big enough, the attacker
can ﬁnd two pairs (using a birthday paradox) (Mi,0, Ci+1,0), (Mi,1, Ci+1,1), such that
Ci+1,0 = Ci+1,1. For a satisfactory probability, the size of sets should be 2
n
2 .
Note that the expandable message block is bound to the input chaining value Ci, and
it requires a constant random oracle.
Arrows represents a query to a random oracle using a corresponding message block.
Note that expandable message block is bound to one input chaining value only and it is
not required meet to its properties for any other input chaining value. It is a set of two
message blocks M1,M2 of diﬀerent length, such that OracleIV (M1) = OracleIV (M2)
for chaining value IV .
4. 10. Complexity of building an expandable message
Complexity of the algorithm is measured in queries to a random oracle. Any other
operation is considered to be constant time. Complexity of building an f1, 2i + 1g-
expandable block is 2i + 2
n
2
+1; 2i + 2
n
2 to build the set S0 and 2
n
2 to build the set S1.
Finding of a common chaining value in sets S0 and S1 is considered to be constant
time operation (it does not require a query to random oracle).
4. 11. Prevention of long message 2
nd
preimage attak
The long-message attack can be prevented even if iterative hash function is used.
Merkle-Damgard iteration can be expressed by IVi = Oracle(Mi, IVi−1).
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Consider a modiﬁcation Oraclei(Mi, IVi−1). The oracle is not constant in the iteration
and it depends on the number of processed blocks. Therefore the attacker cannot build
an expandable message (using our algorithm).
4. 12. Nostradamus (herding) attak
This is an attack against the commitment property of a hash function. It was ﬁrst
proposed by Kesley in [7]. Their analysis has shown, that some hash function based
commitment schemes use a property not guaranteed by a hash function. This leads
to an introduction of a new property called Chosen target forced preﬁx preimage
resistance (CTFP-preimage resistance).
4. 13. Motivation
Alice claims to have some knowledge, and she does not want to reveal it to Bob.
On the other hand, she wants to prove to Bob, she knows. Alice hashes the message
and sends the digest to Bob. Alice’s message is hidden from Bob, because the hash
function is preimage resistant. When Alice needs to keep the secret no longer, she
reveals the message to Bob.
Bob computes its digest and compare it to Alice’s committed digest. If they equals,
Bob trusts Alice she had the knowledge. In bit-commitment scheme, Bob relies on
collision resistance property, because Alice could have used a birthday paradox attack
to create two values for one commitment.
But if Alice claims to know the future, she cannot use the birthday paradox attack
(because she cannot generate all possible outcomes). This sounds reasonable for Bob,
and he can trust Alice she knew the future, when she reveals the message which hashes
to committed value. One would expect Alice needs approximately 2digest length queries
to decieve Bob. However, the attack which is explained later requires approximately
2
digest length
2 queries and some precomputation.
In Mental poker scheme, Alice can gain an advantage using the birthday paradox
attack to obtain two messages for one commitment. But Alice would deﬁnitely prefer
to be able to generate the entire message after she knows the Bob’s value; having two
options is an advantage, but it may not be enough for an attack.
4. 14. Attak
The attack which will be explained in this section gives an attacker a power to commit
a hash value of a message they do not know. When they get to know the message,
they compute the suﬃx of the message, so that the result hashes to the committed
value.
This is a new property called Chosen target forced preﬁx preimage attack (the attacker
can ﬁnd a message (with any preﬁx they want) which hashes to a digest (which was
chosen prior to knowledge of the preﬁx).
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The attack is time-memory trade oﬀ. It requires a precomputed structure with a lot
of entry points and only one exit point. An entry point is a chaining value. Exit point
is a digest D. If a preﬁx leads to a chaining value C which is also an entry point of
the structure, the attacker can easily ﬁnd a suﬃx, such that h(preffix jjsuffix) = D.
The structure can be built of an expandable message, which will be explained at the
end of the chapter. Kelsey proposed in [7] a structure (called Diamond structure)
which leads to a shorter message than the expandable message structure. In [29] it
was shown that the attack can be extended to concatenated hash functions.
The Diamond structure has a lot of entry points (chaining values which allows to
enter the structure). The structure is shown in the next diagram. In this case, entry
points are all chaining values on the top most level (3 in an example) (dashed lines
are possible connections from preﬁx to a diamond structure). If an attack is mounted
on non-strengthen Merkle-Damgard construction, any chaining value in the diamond
structure can be used as entry point.
Digest
4. 14. 1. Building of a diamond structure
The naive approach of building diamond structure is ﬁxing the nodes in the tree and
using a birthday paradox to ﬁnd next node. This approach has a complexity
Pk
i=0 2
i

2
n
2 = 2k+1+
n
2 queries to random oracle. (An attacker has to perform approximately 2
n
2
queries to a random oracle from every chaining value on level i, which has 2i nodes.)
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A better approach does not ﬁx a position of a node in the tree, and therefore it requires
less queries to a random oracle.
The number of queries from a single IV is 2
n
2
− i
2
+ 1
2 , the total work to go to a lower
level is 2
n
2
+ i
2
+ 1
2 . This gives us a total work of
Pk
i=0 2
n
2
+ i
2
+ 1
2 = 2
n
2
+ k+1
2
+ 1
2 queries to the
random oracle. This is a suﬃcient number of queries to ﬁnd a perfect matching on set
of Si with a high probability (the sets Si and Sj for i 6= j are connected in a graph
(they match) iﬀ Si
T
Sj 6= ;).
4. 15. Usage of Diamond struture in an attak
The attacker builds a diamond structure with 2
n
2 entry points, and they commit the
digest of diamond structure.
Once they know the preﬁx of the message, they compute a chaining value IVc of their
message. Then they make 2
n
2 queries with linking message blocks to receive a set of 2
n
2
chaining values. From birthday paradox one of the chaining values is an entry point
to the diamond structure. They submit a message constructed by concatenation of
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preﬁx, linking message block, and all message blocks on the path from the entry point
to the exit point (a dashed line).
Building of diamond structure requires a lot of queries to a random oracle and only top
most level can be used for entry points (otherwise the length of message is diﬀerent.
This leads to a diﬀerent padding block and therefore a diﬀerent digest). If a short
expandable message is appended to a diamond structure, all intermediate chaining
value in the diamond structure can be used as an entry point.
The attack is very similar but uses all intermediate values of diamond structure.
An expandable message can be used for commitment forgery as well.
For non-strengthen Merkle-Damgard construction, the structure can be a long chain
of random messages (entry points are all chaining values). For strengthen Merkle-
Damgard construction, the structure would consist of a long chain of random messages
and an expandable message. But this attack would lead to a long message.
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4. 16. Solution
Presented attacks show that iterative hash function does not behave like a random
oracle. Every property (save preimage resistance) can be attacked with a complexity
O(2
n
2 ). A requirement of another property was shown in the herding attack - an
attack against a random oracle giving a same result is the preimage attack, however,
a time-memory trade oﬀ attack is possible against iterative hash function.
Since the iterative construction is required in many applications (computing a digest
of a data stream) the only solution is computational security. The bound of compu-
tational security is 280, and therefore every secure hash function should have a digest
at least 160 bits long.
4. 16. 1. Wide-pipe hash
Lucks presented in [15] a method to prevent multicollisions in an iterative hash
function. This method is provably secure against multicollisions.
IV
′
i+1 = Compress(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i jjMi) and IV
′′
i+1 = Compress(IV
′′
i , IV
′
i jjMi). There is a
non standard assumption on the compression function called cross collision resistance,
which means it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a message M , such that
Compress(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i ,M) = Compress(IV
′′
i , IV
′
i ,M), for IV
′
i 6= IV
′′
i .
It prevents a reduction of the wide pipe to a narrow pipe hash IV
′
i+1 = IV
′′
i+1 =
Compress(IVi, IVi,Mi).
The version suggested by Preneel uses two diﬀerent random oracles Compress1 and
Compress2.
IV
′
i+1 = Compress1(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i ,Mi), and IV
′′
i+1 = Compress2(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i ,Mi).
cross collision resistance
Let us ﬁnd a probability of a cross collision for a random oracle O.
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This means ﬁnding a message M such that for IV
′
i 6= IV
′′
i , O(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i jjM) =
O(IV
′′
i , IV
′
i jjM).
The space of possible values O(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i jjM), O(IV
′′
i , IV
′
i jjM) is 2
2h, and only 2h
values are of the form X,X. The probability of ﬁnding M1,M2, such that
O(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i jjM1)O(IV
′′
i , IV
′
i jjM2) is 2
−h. Since the message block M is the same for
both X = O(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i jjM), and X = O(IV
′′
i , IV
′
i jjM), the probability of ﬁnding such
a message M is 2−h−m.
We will show that if a compression function is constructed using Davies-Meyer con-
struction, and the builtin block cipher is ideal, the probability of a cross collision is
the same, which also follows from [21].
Davies-Meyer construction: F (H,M) = EM(H) +H , where E is a block cipher.
If the compression function is a Davies-Meyer function, we have:
IV
′
i+1 = Compress(IV
′
i , IV
′′
i jjMi) = EIV ′′
i
||Mi
(IV
′
i ) + IV
′
i
IV
′′
i+1 = Compress(IV
′′
i , IV
′
i jjMi) = EIV ′
i
||Mi
(IV
′′
i ) + IV
′′
i
We want to reduce the wide-pipe to a narrow-pipe to get fast multicollisions. For a
narrow-pipe hash we require IV
′
i+1 = IV
′′
i+1.
EIV ′′
i
||Mi
(IV
′
i ) + IV
′
i = EIV ′
i
||Mi
(IV
′′
i ) + IV
′′
i
E
IV
′′
i
||Mi
(IV
′
i ) EIV ′
i
||Mi
(IV
′′
i ) = IV
′′
i   IV
′
i
E(IV ′
i
+δi)||Mi
(IV
′
i ) EIV ′
i
||Mi
(IV
′
i + δi) = δi
So the attacker wants to cancel the diﬀerences at the beginning of the key and in
message using only bytes at the end of the key.
This would be a very non standard requirement for a block cipher. Even though there
is no generic attack better than a brute force, an instance of block cipher used in the
compression function can be vulnerable to such attack.
Fix δi, and IVi. Ek is a bijection.
Note that for a ﬁxed Mi there is  2
|M |−|H| messages Mj (distribution of keys K such
that EK(x) = y, for x, y ﬁxed, is uniform), such that
E−1
(IV
′
i
+δi)||Mj
(E
IV
′
i
||Mi
(IV
′
i + δi) + δi) = IV
′
i
Since only Mi is a cross collision, we have a probability 
2|M|−|H|
22|M|
= 2−|H|−|M | that
a cross collision exists for this Mi. Trying  2
−|H|−|M | random Mis will give a cross
collision.
For jM j = m, jH j = h, we have a probability of a cross collision in Davies-Meyer
compression function = 2−h−m = 2−h−m. Therefore any Davies-Meyer compression
function built from any ideal block cipher is cross-collision resistant.
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